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Moore et al.: An Evaluation of Cockpit Resource Management Training in Qantas

AN EVALUATION OF COCKPIT RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
T W G IN QANTAS

P. J. Moore, R. A Telfer, and R. L. Wilkinson

This study reports an evaluation of a Cockpit Resource Management (CRM) training program at Qantas
Airlines in Australia. Four sets of survey data were gathered: Two from crew involved in CRM and a specific
Line Oriented Flight Training (LOFT) scenario conducted in a simulator; and two from instructors, one from
the LOFI' instructors, the other from the CRM instructors. The crew results showed that CRM was
perceived to have improved teamwork and leadership and that LOFT was viewed favorably. The instructor
results showed generally successful implementation of the decision-making strategies but indicated that certain
groups were not sufficiently assertive in communicating their preferred options. The instructors were
generally positive in their evaluation of the CRM program. Implications are discussed.
INTRODUCTION

After two years of research and development, CRM
training was introduced by Qantas in May 1989.
Management consultants (Coopers and Lybrand) were
commissioned to aid the airline in designing the course.
A committee drawn from the aircrew association and line
and training staff synthesized and adapted the
consultants' recommendations, using observations from
full mission simulator checks of command trainees. It was
concluded that the course would be designed to
complement standard operating procedures (SOPs). Just
as the SOPs ensured the safety standards of routine
operations and anticipated emergencies, so the CRM
would supply tools to support pilots in the management
of these activities.
An outline of the Qantas CRM course

The focus of the course was on aircrew teamwork and
decision-making. A model of decision-making was
represented by the mnemonic GRADE (Gather
information; Review it; Analyze alternatives; Decide;
Evaluate outcome). Another mnemonic, TORA,
represented the situational factors affecting decisionmaking.
Represented as a square figure, the situational factors
could be represented in the diagram. TORA was derived
from the initial letters of the four points of a quadrant
formed from the two dimensions of the expertise of crew
and the critical nature of the task being undertaken
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(make the decision Together; Offer the decision-making
process to another team member; Refer to others while
the captain leads the process; the captain makes the
decision Alone). The "refernarea of TORA was seen as
the most important aspect.
Attitude was described in terms of a graphical
relationship between the effectiveness of an individual's
input and the forcefulness of that input, showing a low of
"withdrawn submissiven rising to a peak at "supportive
assertive," then progressive deterioration to "dominant
aggressive."
Leadership was conceptualized in the familiar terms of
the Blake and Mouton model (concern for people versus
concern for performance) conveyed in terms of three
overlapping foci: task, team, and individual (Blake and
Mouton, 1982).
The notion of managing upward was clarified by the
provision of appropriate support to the leader by judging
the degree of assertiveness required. This language of
assertiveness was incorporated in the company's
Operations Policy Manual in the following four ways:
1. Express personal concern.
2. Define preferred alternatives.
3. Ask for an evaluation.
4. In an emergency use the phrase: "Captain,you must
listen!"
The LOFT program

The CRM course was supported by a LOFT program
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that met the approval of the Australian Civil Aviation
Authority as a cyclic, 12-hour trainingflicense renewal
package. It occurs in four simulator sessions per year as
part of a three-year program.
A two-day course was designed to train instructors for
the LOFT program and to ensure that they consolidated
the CRM approach. The first day reviewed the CRM
course, and the second day concentrated on LOFT
scenario construction, LOFT briefing and debriefing, and
a recognition of the issues and principles involved. The
LOFT program was implemented in three B747-400, two
B767, and two B747-200/300 simulators.
EVALUATION METHODOLOGY
Because baseline data were not available, a pre-post
survey design was not possible. Instead, the following
four sources were tapped for descriptive and judgmental
data:
1. Crew Survey: This was a six-item survey of crew inline operations, with their responses classified according
to aircraft type (747P44/767) and to rank (Captain, FIO;
S/O; E/O). The items asked whether, since the
introduction of CRM training:
The use of the GRADE process had significantly
improved decision-making skills in the cockpit;
The skills taught in CRM training had significantly
improved crew teamwork;
The skills taught in CRM training had significantly
improved leadership;
Operational decisions were reached by the crew as
a team;
Crew members were more inclined to be assertive
in expressing their operational opinions;
Senior crew members were more likely to respond
to the recommended assertive behavior from other crew
members.
2. LOFT Survey: This was a 20-item survey of crew
who had undertaken a specific LOFT scenario. The
scenario was a night flight from San Francisco to Los
Angeles in a complicated weather pattern. There are
operational problems associated with the five airports
written into the scenario: San Francisco has a crosswind
problem; Los Angeles has low clouds and poor visibility;
Las Vegas has a problem with approach aids; Sacramento
has marginal weather and aid unserviceability, and

Oakland has a runway problem. None of these airports
presents any problems under normal conditions and there
is no reason to suspect that the flight cannot be
completed routinely.
At briefing the crew are warned of a security threat
from Gulf War agitators. At about halfway through the
flight, a bomb explosion occurs in the aft hold,
decompressing the aircraft and failing the number one
hydraulic system of nose and body gear extension and
inboard trailing edge flaps.
After completing the forced descent, the crew must
decide on a course of action. No airport is entirely
suitable because of various problems: crosswind with
possible control damage; a night approach t o a runway
not approved by the company; committing to an airport
requiring an alternate although the extended gear could
not be raised, en route safety height problems, and so on.
There is no unqualified correct solution. Responses were
classified by aircraft type (744/747P67) and by position of
respondent (Captain; FIO; F/E).
The NASAIUniversity of Texas LINE-LOS checklist
(Butler, 1991) provided the items for the questionnaire,
with responses made on a seven-point Likert scale. This
questionnaire, in use with several airlines, assesses eight
dimensions of behavior (including communications;
decision making; team building and maintenance;
workload management; and situational awareness) as well
as proficiency and overall effectiveness. Questions on the
following 20 topics were asked:
Awareness of the LOFT scenario and problem;
The effect of any awareness on the training value
of the scenario;
The extent of the realism;
The level of difficulty;
The level of crew performance on the mission;
The level of personal performance;
The value of the LOFT session for crew
co-ordination training;
The technical training value of the session;
The extent of applicable learning from the session;
Team work;
Extent of talking or arguing;
Extent of irritation or frustration;
Extent of positive contributions to the decision;

--
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Table 1
Survey of crew in-line operations (n = 243)
(means and standard deviations)

ITEM

744

747

767

CAPT

F/O

S/O

VO

TOTAL

1

Improved cockpit decisions

4.82
(1.42)

4.74
(1.32)

4.79
(1.23)

4.71
(1.42)

4.77
(1.24)

5.12
(1.20)

4.29
(1.53)

4.75
(1.35)

2

Improved teamwork

5.04
(1.32)

4.74
(1.50)

4.91
(1.26)

4.91
(1.36)

4.98
(1.22)

4.97
(1.34)

4.53
(1.66)

4.93
(1.31)

3

Improved leadership

4.24
(1.36)

4.48
(1.35)

4.59
(1.23)

4.29
(1.36)

4.58
(1.27)

4.41
(1.21)

4.29
(1.49)

4.42
(1.32)

4

Team decisions

4.61
(1.47)

4.48
(1.47)

4.97
(1.31)

4.70
(1.55)

5.00
(1.14)

4.35
(1.37)

4.18
(1.38)

4.74
(1.36)

5

Greater assertiveness

5.41
(1.37)

5.35
(1.21)

5.24
(1.16)

5.22
(1.29)

5.47
(1.17)

5.56
(1.19)

5.12
(1.17)

5.34
(1.22)

6

Senior crew more responsive

4.71
(1.24)

4.85
(1.38)

4.80
(1.42)

4.61
(1.29)

4.94
(1.35)

4.88
(1.25)

4.65
(1.50)

4.79
(1.30)

Scale: 1 = Strongly disagree through 7 = Strongly agree

Unilateral decisions made by the captain;
Crew assertiveness about their opinions;
Crew evaluation of decisions;
Knowledge and helpfulness of the instructor;
Value of the debriefing;
Value of the feedback from the videotaping;
Value of LOFT, overall, as a training technique.
3. LOFT Instructor Survey: This was a 12-itemsurvey
of instructors involved with the LOFT exercise covered
by the survey above. The responses were categorized
according to aircraft type (744/747/767). The items
covered the following aspects of crew performance:
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Use of the GRADE process and each of the six
stages;
Team performance on GRADE;
Choice of diversion;
Assertiveness of crew in commslnicating preferred
options;
The captain's role (in terms of the TORA model);
The crew's operation as a team in the whole
process.
4. CRM Instructor Survey: This was an 11-item survey
of CRM instructors. The responses were categorized by
position: simulator instructor; senior check captain; check
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captain; check and training captain; promotional training
captain; or senior check engineer. The items covered the
following:
Perceived value of the GRADE model as a
decision-making tool;
View of leadership in decision-making;
Appropriateness of the use of GRADE in
operational decisions in emergency situations not covered
by a checklist;
Need for decision-making training;
Value of the language of assertiveness in CRM
training;
Effect of the REFER process of TORA on the
leadership of captains;
The primacy of task over team or individual in
flight, pre-flight and post-flight;
Extent of groupthink as an aircrew problem;
Value of the DARTS checklist at briefing;
Effect of managing upward on flightdeck harmony;
The balance of emphasis on CRM in Qantas.
RESULTS
It should be noted that in some cases pilots failed to
indicate their rank and/or aircraft type and hence their
data were not examined from those perspectives,
although their data were included in the totals. Given
recent trends in the reporting of data like ours (see
Lundeberg, Fox, & Puncochar, 1994), we decided to use
means and standard deviation to describe our data.
Crew survey
Table 1 shows the results of the survey of 243 flight
crew involved in line operations. Given that the scale
used a seven-point scale ranging from "Strongly disagree"
(1) to "Strongly agree" (7), the overall result is on the
positive side of neutral, but not markedly so. The
responses bordered toward "slightly agreen for the view
that the GRADE process had improved cockpit decision
making; that CRM skills had improved crew teamwork
and leadership; that operational decisions were being
reached by the crew as a team; and that senior crew were
more responsive to the recommended assertive behavior
from other crew members.
Stronger agreement (between "slightly agree" and
"agree") was gained in response to the view that crew
were more inclined to be assertive in expressing their
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operational decisions.
ANOVAs conducted on item scores for the three
types (744, 747, 767) and four rank categories (captain,
and so on) showed that there were no significant
differences between aircraft types or crew status. Worth
noting, however, is that the most subordinate crew
member (second officer) was most supportive of the
effects of GRADE on improved decision-making (Item
1). This result indicates a greater involvement of all team
members, perhaps to an unprecedented degree. Flight
engineers, however, provided the least support for
improved decision-making, their scores being the lowest
on this item and others. This finding could have been
due, at least in some part, to their attitudes toward
change in a context where their redundancy seemed
imminent. In addition, there are historical (and spatial)
reasons for engineers perceiving themselves to be out of
the loop.
A similar pattern of response can be found in Item 4,
which stated that operational decisions were reached by
the crew as a team. The first officer was most in
agreement, the engineer least in agreement.
LOFT survey
The findings are presented in Table 2. For Items 3-20
a mean of more than 4.0 indicates that the response has
been positive. Items 11, 12, and 14 require reversal
because they express a negative view. Given those
criteria, an overview of the total results shown in Table
2 supports the view that the LOFT exercise is a valuable
training technique. The responses show that the exercise
gained a reasonably high approval rating of 5.45 out of 7
(Item 3); that the value of the learning exercise was rated
at a reasonably high 5.30 out of 7 (Item 9); that the
crews gave themselves a result of 80% (5.63 out of 7,
Item 5); and that individuals gave themselves an average
mark of 71% on their performance (Item 6). Again,
statistical analyses showed no significant differences due
to aircraft type.
Narrative additions to the questionnaire indicated the
enthusiasm of pilots for LOFT as a form of training.
What many found particularly useful was the opportunity
to see a situation through to its conclusion, rather than
having the simulator re-set after an immediate emergency
had been dealt with.
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Table 2
Survey of aircrew after LOFT exercise (n = 163)
(means and standard deviations)

ITEM

TOTAL

767

747

744

Y

N

Y

N

Y

N

Y

N

1

Awareness of scenario and LOFT problem

56%

45%

21%

79%

51%

49%

68%

32%

2

This reduced training value of LOFT

40%

60%

31%

69%

33%

67%

31%

69%

3

Realism of the scenario

5.55

(1.10)

5.56

(0.81)

5.48

(0.73)

5.45

(0.99)

4

Difficulty of the scenario

4.80

(0.83)

4.82

(0.90)

4.68

(0.91)

4.80

(0.92)

5

How well did the crew perform on the mission?

5.15

(1.04)

5.56

(1.00)

5.57

(1.01)

5.63

(0.98)

6

How well did you personally perform?

4.63

(1.01)

4,85

(0.92)

4.92

(0.91)

4.97

(0.95)

7

Rating of the LOFT session for crew co-ordinating
training

5.80

(0.89)

5.68

(12 9 )

5.86

(0.95)

5.67

(1.I 8)

8

Rating of technical training value of this LOFT
session

5.20

(1.40)

5.46

(1.28)

5.57

(1.04)

5.41

(1.22)

9

How much have you learned to use on the line?

5.20

(0.77)

5.39

(1.04)

5.44

(0.94)

5.30

(1.09)

10

Our crew really worked as a team

5.84

(0.59)

5.95

(0.64)

6.11

(0.57)

5.99

(0.67)

11

We spent too much time talking or arguing

1.75

(0.44)

2.00

(0.91)

1.84

(0.55)

1.87

(0.89)

12

Dealing with crew left me irritated and frustrated

1.55

(0.60)

1.68

(0.90)

1.95

(1.43)

1.67

(1.00)

13

All crew made a positive contribution to decisions

5.95

(1.05)

5.89

(1-10)

6.30

(0.57)

6.00

(1.05)

14

Captain made most decisions, not involving
others

3.20

(1.54)

2.80

(1.55)

2.68

(1.55)

2.94

(1.64)

15

When necessary, crew members asserted
opinions

5.75

(1.16)

5.75

(0.74)

5.97

(0.55)

5.82

(0.97)

16

Our crew evaluated its decisions

4.90

(1.65)

5.23

(1.22)

5.30

(1.10)

5.23

(1.36)

17

Our LOFT instructor was knowledgeable and
helpful

5.90

(0.91)

6.05

(0.80)

6.35

(0.59)

6.14

(0.77)

18

The debriefing after LOFT was highly useful for all
crew

5.95

(0.89)

5.67

(1.23)

5.81

(1.00)

5.66

(1.18)

19

The videotape of the LOFT provided important
feedback

4.90

(1.59)

4.62

(1.72)

4.44

(1.80)

4.47

(1.75)

20

Overall, LOFT is an extremely useful training
technique.

5.90

(1.59)

5.64

(1.OO)

6.08

(1.10)

5.81

(1.00)

Note: Response on a 7-point scale, negative low, positive high, for Items 3-20
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When LOFT scenarios are being designed it is difficult
for both the designer and/or the instructor to design one
that is both realistic and novel. Most participants were
aware of the LOFT scenario, but the awareness differed
widely across fleets (compare the 747 and 744 results for
Item 1). Such a difference could be linked to company
operations for the various fleets and the extent to which
the scenario is part of these operations. That more than
a third of the participants saw the lack of novelty as a
problem may indicate a need for greater exposition by
instructors on the inevitability of awareness if scenarios
are to be as realistic as possible.
The response was not as predictable on Item 14 (The
captain made most decisions, not involving others). In
the previous reversal items (11 and 12), the means were
in the range of 1.55 to 2.0, with totals of 1.87 and 1.67.
In Item 14, however, the range was 2.68 to 3.2, with a
total of 2.94. The upper extreme in the range was the 744
crew, whose mean rating of 3.2 meant that they were on
the "slightly disagree" side of "neutral." This is evidence
that GRADEtTORA were not being implemented in the
744 two-crew crews as well as they were in the three-crew
747 or the two-crew 767. The captains who were more
likely to make more decisions alone were generally the
older, more senior captains. However, in the absence of
more detailed knowledge of the individuals involved, it is
difficult to postulate other bases for these differences.
LOFT instructor survey
The results are presented in Table 3. Items 1 and 5
had a dichotomous response, clearly indicating a
perception of successful implementation of the GRADE
process and an observation by instructors of crews
actually implementing the decision model. Item 8
indicates the range of selected diversions, the spread
indicating the robustness of the scenario in that crews
were able to justify three different choices of alternate.
For the remaining items, the midpoint of 4 on the 7point scale provides a criterion for interpretation.
Despite the fact that most instructors perceived (81 of
the 95, Item 1) that the GRADE process was identifiable
and that the crew "decided" (89, Item S), the instructors
were far less positive in their ratings of the ways in which
the process was employed by the crew as a team.
Gathering (Item 2 mean = 3.31) and reviewing ( Item 3
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mean = 3.10) were performed better than the analysis of
the information (Item 4 mean = 2.78), evaluation of that
information (Item 6 mean = 2.36), and crew performance
as a team in the decision-making process (Item 7 mean
= 2.94). Yet the instructors perceived that the crews
operated as teams (Item 12 mean = 3.80). The data
suggest that the gathering process was performed better
than the succeeding stages of the GRADE process, in the
eyes of the instructors.
The results of Items 9, 10, and 11 can be linked by
their consistency. The instructors thought that neither the
FIO or El0 were assertive in communicating their
preferred options, and that the captain tended to make
the decisions alone.
It is possible, too, that the order of the presentation
of the questionnaire items-starting with GRADE, then
dealing with its components-may have induced a
response set. It may be useful in future studies to reverse
this sequence.
CRM instructor survey
The CRM instructors were far more positive in their
evaluation of the effectiveness of decisional and
leaderships functions introduced by the CRM course.
Modal scores shown in Table 4 can be interpreted by
means of a midpoint of 4 on the 7-point scale. @ results
fall above this point, suggesting a response set when one
considers that Item 4 (Qantas crews did not require any
training in decision-making); Item 8 (Groupthink is never
a problem); Item 10 (Managing upward leads to
disharmony); and Item 11 (There is too much emphasis
on CRM) could reasonably have been expected to have
a modal response at least closer to the midpoint, if not
below it.
DISCUSSION
The results raise several questions on evaluation
methodology, attitudes and change, crew behaviors in
different aircraft types, the effect of video replay on
participants' self-evaluation of their performance,
scenario construction for LOFT, and the consequences of
a perceived dichotomy between theory and practice. Such
a dichotomy precludes uniform implementation of CRM
within an airline and across the industry. As Helmreich
(1993) has pointed out: "The implementation of CRM
will not be complete until acceptance of its contents is
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more uniform among the organizations that use it."
First, for evaluation of CRM to be optimized,
base-line data are needed. The critical point for the
design of evaluation is when an airline decides on its
rationale for CRM. With the CRM objectives come the
criteria for its evaluation. From the criteria come the
sources of evaluative data, and the scheduling of their
periodic collection by means of observation, surveys,
i n t e ~ e w scompany
,
operating statistics, and so on. The
same criteria are the bases for the derivation of
evaluation instruments. The instruments then need to be
applied in a field trial, as tests of reliability and validity,
before being applied prior to the initial CRM to establish
base-line data.
Formative evaluation, conducted systematically during
the progress of CRM, can be of value to participants and
presenters during the course of a CRM program. It can
help participants to ensure that aspects of high personal
relevance and significance are incorporated, and it can
provide vital feedback to presenters. In brief, the
evaluation of CRM is as critical as the program itself.
This importance needs to be reflected in both the budget
and in critical-path planning before the implementation
of CRM programs.
Second, CRM programs are essentially concerned with
improving the quality of crew behavior. This is an
attempt to change the way human beings behave. It is
insufficient to simply show people a "betternway. There
is a need for sustained impetus in a variety of ways:
support of management and peers, bulletins, notices,
recognition by superiors, and so on.
In their 1986 survey of Qantas captains, consultants
concluded that 75% of the captains did not include other
flight crew in operational decision-making. Neither did
crew members act assertively to support the leader. The
Cockpit Resource Management Course was introduced
and, although receiving enthusiastic support from the
aircrew associations and those who volunteered to help
compile the course, the majority greeted the introduction
of CRM training with either indifference or hostility.
Response to the course itself was positive. The
participants were supportive and, from all reports,
enjoyed and actively participated in the course. A survey
carried out on completion of each course indicated that
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most participants believed the course was very
professionally compiled and presented. They almost
unanimously agreed that the concepts were valuable and
useful. However, when asked whether the CRM course
would change the way they conducted their day-to-day
aircraft operations, the answer was a resounding
"negative!" (Wilkinson, 1991).
Perhaps one of the implications is that this
demonstrable gap between concept and practice has to be
bridged. LOFT training is one means of aiding this
transition. Others could include brief follow-up refresher
courses and on-the-job activities.
Crew behavior in decision-making appeared to vary
with group size. In dyads (744, 767) captains tended to
make fewer decisions alone than those in the 747 triads.
Further, 767 first officers tended to be more assertive
than 747 first officers. This result supports further
research of the type described by Clothier (1991) into
behavioral interactions across various aircraft types. It is
relevant to note the extension of this line of research into
cross-cultural perspectives of CRM (Johnston, 1992) in
which some of the major contextual variables of
aeronautical decision-makingand judgment are provided.
Third, there is the question of pilots' self-evaluation.
Are they their own worst critics? Crew rated their
individual performances lower than the team
performance. Ideally, this would be the result of
observation of synergy in action, when the achievement
of group power applied to problem-resolution was
graphically evident. To test this hypothesis it would be
valuable to ensure when video is employed in CRM that
participants were desensitized to its application, and that
a degree of detachment could be introduced into
self-evaluation. Perhaps a coarse rating scale or some
fairly relaxed group trials at evaluation of, say, the
instructor on videotape may be a suitable orientation to
remove the possibility that such results could be gained
by self-imposition of unnecessarily rigorous standards.
Fourth, there is the difficulty involved in scenario
construction for LOFT. On the one hand,
line-orientation implies the probability of actual
occurrence in line flying. On the other hand, the scenario
has to provide the challenge of novelty and quintessential
decision-making in terms of process and consequence.
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Table 3
Survey of instructors of the LOFT exercise (n = 95)
(means and standard deviations)
ITEM

RESPONSE

1

Was GRADE process identiiiable?

2

Did crew "Gather Information"? (new old)

3.31 (1.52)

3

Did crew "Review the Information"?

3.10 (1.40)

4

Did crew "Analyse the Alternatives"?

2.78 (1.60)

5

Did crew "Decide"?

Y-89

6

Did crew "Evaluate"? (not at all -fully)

2.36 (1.75)

7

Was Grade process performed as a team?

2.94 (1.47)

8

Which diversion was selected?

SF0 - 33 LAX 23
OAIC 3 NGO - 30
Others 6

9

Was FIO assertive in communicating preferred option? (not at all very)

2.92 (1.45)

10

Was E l 0 assertive in communicating preferred option?

2.67 (1.56)

11

Did the Captain involve others in problem solving?

3.03 (1.46)

Y-81

-

N-5

-

-

-

12

N-14

-

Did the crew operate as a team? (badly well)

-p-~-

-

-

-

-

--

3.80 (1.12)

Note: Items 2-12, 7-point scale, extremes indicated i n brackets
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Table 4

Survey of instructors in CRM (n = 79)
ITEM
1.

RESPONSE

The GRADE decision making process is a useful tool in decision making.
6.29

(0.60)

5.67

(1.24)

5.41

(1.45)

5.82

(1.06)

Teaching the recommended language of assertiveness is an important aspect of CRM
training.

5.92

(1.33)

The encouragement of Captains to operate in the REFER box of the TORA chart leads
to weak leadership.

5.75

(1.19)

Captains should generally concentrate upon the task to be achieved. The TEAM
and/or INDIVIDUAL are a pre-flight and post-flight consideration.

5.53

(1.22)

8.

GROUPTHINK is never a problem amongst Qantas aircrew.

5.76

(1.26)

9.

The DARTS checklist is a useful tool at briefing.

4.94

(1.35)

10.

MANAGING UPWARDS leads to disharmony on the flight deck.
5.43

(1.17)

4.85

(1.64)

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

11.

A good leader always makes quick and effective decisions by himself.

The GRADE process is appropriate for operational decision in emergency situations
not covered by a checklist.
Qantas crews did not require any training in decision making.

There is too much emphasis on CRM in Qantas.

Reconciling these two extremes is further complicated by
the fact that the professional pilot is continually
discussing and updating skills, knowledge, and
procedures. Recent research into pilot learning indicates
that successful airline pilots use discussion with their
colleagues as an important source of learning (Moore,
1991; Telfer, 1991). Perhaps LOFT scenarios based on
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actual occurrence stimulate such discussion among pilots.
Finally, the evaluation of this CRM program
demonstrated the gap that can often exist between theory
and practice. The gap is one that is usually more likely in
educational rather than training programs. A training
program usually has a narrow focus on a well-defined
task or skill, with a demonstrable application. Education,
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however, usually deals with reasons for human
performance, as well as the nature of the activity itself.
Given the broader focus, it has to incorporate vagaries
and variables associated with human motivation, self
concept, norms, attitudes, and values. It cannot be
dogmatic or sweepingly universal. For those associated
with the specificity of flight training and professional
aviation, the lack of prescription can be frustrating. The
lack of a unitary theory to govern the way people behave,
in contrast to why wings generate lift, is a matter that
merits explicit (rather than implicit) inclusion in CRM.
This discussion may help participants recognize how the
designers chose to emphasize the aspects included in the
course, and the constraints under which they operated.
CONCLUSION
There are a number of methodological factors to be
considered if evaluation of CRM is to be valid and
reliable. Base-line data are vital, and instruments require
demonstrable reliability derived from rigorous field
testing. The need for formative and summativeevaluation

is a critical component in the design of CRM programs,
and requires consideration in the initial stages rather
than some time after the program has been operating.
EPILOGUE
In 1990 a Qantas 747 departed Cairns on a seven and
a half hour flight to Narita. Near the top of the climb the
aircraft began to vibrate and control difficulties were
experienced because, unknown to the crew, part of the
wing had detached. Over the next hour the crew grappled
with wrong advice, pressure from schedulers on the
, an attempt by
disposition of the aircraft for s e ~ c i n gand
air traffic control to have another airliner formate on
them to inspect the damage.
The aircraft landed safely at a diversion airfield.
Analysis of the decision showed that both the process
and result were exemplary. The captain pointed out that
he had deliberately applied CRM principles that he had
practiced in LOFT, and regarded his ability to handle the
in-flight emergency as a direct result of that training.
That is the ultimate evaluation of CRM.0
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